I. INTRODUCTION
Websites, Internet retailers, and search engines (known as "information location tools"') increasingly rely on their users to generate content, interest, transactions, and value. In the Wild West, which first characterized the development of the Internet, notions that Usenet sites and bulletin boards could-or should-be responsible for content posted by users of the services seemed antithetical to the online ethos. 2 In response to early litigation regarding this third-party liability, 3 Congress enacted legislation modifying copyright law 4 and defamation law 5 to provide Web hosts broad immunity for indirect infringement.
By comparison, the statutory protection enacted for trademarks is limited to the unauthorized use of trademarks in domain names. Statutory protection has not yet developed for trademarks with respect to consumer postings or advertising purchased by third parties. Therefore, laws addressing unauthorized use of trademarks have evolved through the courts. 7 Since the enactment of these various laws (defamation immunity in 1996;8 the copyright notice-and-takedown in 19989 and anticybersquatting COPYRIGHT OFFICE 12 (Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf 514 [41:513
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in 199910), the Internet has moved from an interesting social phenomenon to a central component of social interaction and media engagement. Facebook now boasts 845 million monthly active users, 250 million photos uploaded daily, and 2.7 billion "likes" and comments each day." YouTube boasts 48 hours of video uploaded per minute and 3 billion views each day.1 2 Content on these various social media sites has triggered complaints from companies worldwide. In 2011, Chilling Effects, a project of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, recorded 47,628 complaints from companies in the United States and slightly fewer from companies located outside the country.' 3 Twitter has received a number of complaints as well. In response, "Twitter has taken the unusual step of making [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] takedown notices public, in partnership with Chilling Effects ... and several universities. The site shows 4,410 cease and desist notices dating back to November 2010."4 While the percentage of complaints suggests that the notice-and-takedown system is only a minor aspect of the Internet media ecology, the existence of the system remains a source of tremendous anger for many. 
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Moreover, significant litigation in the past year has refocused on using these legal tools to tidy the Internet and to cleanse it of unwanted or unauthorized content.' 6 This Article focuses on the recent activity in the courts and Congress regarding the various attempts to deal with unauthorized, unwanted, and controversial content available on the Internet.
II. COPYRIGHT
The notice-and-takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) were written in response to Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc."1 7 In this case, the Church of Scientology used copyright infringement actions to stop the unauthorized disclosure of church documents and teachings it treated as confidential.' 8 Although the court found no direct copyright infringement for the bulletin board service for hosting the content uploaded by the defendant, the court did not dismiss the claims of secondary liability based on the theory of contributory infringement.' 9 The court found that once the plaintiff had put the defendant on notice of the infringing content, the act of facilitating distribution of protected works could amount to substantial participation:
Providing a service that allows for the automatic distribution of all Usenet postings, infringing and noninfringing, goes well beyond renting a premises to an infringer... . Thus, it is fair, assuming Netcom is able to take simple measures to prevent further damage to plaintiffs' copyrighted works, to hold Netcom liable for contributory infringement where Netcom has knowledge of [the direct infringer's] infringing postings yet continues to aid in the accomplishment of [the infringer's] purpose of publicly distributing the postings.20
In light of the potentially broad common law secondary liability that could arise under Copyright, Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 512. Section 512(c) applies to those systems that store and make data available at the request of the consumer: Information Residing on Systems or Networks at Direction of Users.-(1) In general.-A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider-(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
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The first section of the statute closely mirrors the common law protection of secondary liability. 23 Section 512(c)(1)(A) describes the copyright contributory liability standard. 24 As the Supreme Court explained, "One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement ... and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it."25 As to vicarious liability, in Viacom International v. YouTube, Inc., 26 the Second Circuit held that the language of § 512(c)(1)(B) requires "something more" than the common law right and ability to control. 27 The Viacom court rejected as legislative history as confusing and nondispositive. 28 The court explained that "if Congress had intended § 512(c)(1)(B) to be coextensive with vicarious liability, 'the statute could have accomplished that result in a more direct manner."' 2 9
Instead, the "something more" requires that "a service provider exert[] substantial influence on the activities of users."
30
If this substantial influence is demonstrated, then the service provider may be liable "without necessarily-or even frequently-acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity." 31 The heightened influence is consistent with the Restatement approach to vicarious liability, which imputes all the actions of the agent to the principal when the agent is an employee 32 
31id.
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03(2) (2006) ("A principal is subject to vicarious liability to a third party harmed by an agent's conduct when .. . the agent is an employee who commits a tort while acting within the scope of employment .... ).
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with, at least, apparent authority. The "something more" test of Viacom reconciles vicarious liability with its common-law roots.
The provisions of § 512(c)(1) allow courts to distinguish between those services that are materially participating in copyright violations with knowledge of their activities from those entities that can be used for infringement along with non-infringing activities. A service may avoid material participation provided that entity "responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to" the material that is claimed to be infringing. while Yahoo, Facebook, Rapidshare, and other services host usergenerated content and face similar scrutiny. While some of the users are undoubtedly uploading content that infringes exclusive rights of copyright owners, these services do not seek out these customers, provide preferential tools for infringement, or promote infringing activities in their materials.
In contrast to these services, those such as Napster, Grokster, and Streamcast materially contribute to the infringement activities of their user community. 38 Most importantly, in separating these provisions, the courts tend to look at § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), which imposes a duty when the content host becomes "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent." 3 9
3 Id. ("A principal is subject to vicarious liability to a third party harmed by an agent's conduct when . .. the agent commits a tort when acting with apparent authority in dealing with a third party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal."). 
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A. Red Flag Test Adds Little
This subsection has become known as the "red flag" test. Once the service provider becomes aware of these facts, it will lose the protection of the safe harbor unless it acts expeditiously. 40 Despite the construction, however, the duty is on the copyright owner to make the service provider aware of these facts and circumstances.
4 1 In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 42 for example, "there were a number of red flags that made it apparent infringing activity was afoot, noting that the defendant hosted sites with names such as 'illegal.net' and 'stolencelebritypics.com,' as well as password hacking websites, which obviously infringe." 4 3 These highly suggestive facts were not enough. Instead, the Ninth Circuit explained that it places no investigative duties on the service provider."
As such, generalized knowledge of infringing use is insufficient to find secondary liability for a host. 45 Once the copyright holder has provided the information, however, the service provider is under a duty to act expeditiously. 46 Both the service provider and the copyright holder have certain duties to assure the system 4' 48 works.
47
The service provider must provide a designated agent. 48 Section 512(c)(2) states:
Designated agent.-The limitations on liability established in this subsection apply to a service provider only if the service provider has designated an agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement described in paragraph (3), by making available through its service, including on its website in a location accessible to the public, and by providing to the Copyright Office, substantially the following information:
(continued)
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Assuming the agent has been designated properly, the copyright holder must provide notice to that agent in a form consistent with the statute to afford effective notice.
9
(A) the name, address, phone number, and electronic mail address of the agent.
(B) other contact information which the Register of Copyrights may deem appropriate.
The Register of Copyrights shall maintain a current directory of agents available to the public for inspection, including through the Internet, in both electronic and hard copy formats, and may require payment of a fee by service providers to cover the costs of maintaining the directory.
Id § 512(c)(2). 49 Section 512(c)(3) states:
Elements of notification.-(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement must be a written communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider that includes substantially the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to (continued) 
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The notice is not difficult in form, but one providing a takedown notice must attend to the details with care. The work or works must be identified correctly,o the notice must provide sufficient information to identify the location of the infringing work and source of the infringement, 5 ' and the copyright holder-or the authorized agent of the copyright holder-must attest that the complainant "has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law."
52 Finally, the complainant must attest that the notice is accurate and authorized under penalty of peijury.
53
There is no detailed, objective information on the attitude taken by various vendors regarding the process of takedown. Nonetheless, many use services such as Audible Magic or Vobile to create "digital fingerprints" of the files presented to the service provider.
4
If those act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(B)(i) Subject to clause (ii), a notification from a copyright owner or from a person authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner that fails to comply substantially with the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be considered under paragraph (1)(A) in determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.
(ii) In a case in which the notification that is provided to the service provider's designated agent fails to comply substantially with all the provisions of subparagraph (A) but substantially complies with clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A), clause (i) of this subparagraph applies only if the service provider promptly attempts to contact the person making the notification or takes other reasonable steps to assist in the receipt of notification that substantially complies with all the provisions of subparagraph (A). [41:513 522 TIDYING UP THE INTERNET uploaded files match files in the database, the content is flagged and may be removed."
Id. § 512(c)(3).
Or maybe not. YouTube, for example, uses the software to match the digital fingerprint to the actual usage rights on file in its automated system. 6 If the usage allows the file to be shown with advertising, then it adds a badge enabling the advertising. 57 Using these types of tools, companies may be developing strategies to monetize and tacitly authorize what would otherwise have been unauthorized user-sourced third-party content. For example, a digital fingerprint of a cloud music sharing service could measure the number of times a song is uploaded as well as downloaded and streamed. This would make each event part of the license fee for the music and would re-associate any advertising with the usersourced content so that it legally takes on the same attributes as the authorized content on the site-as YouTube has done.
B. Counter Notification
Although copyright holders must make a good faith determination that the material uploaded by third parties violates their exclusive rights," this may not mean that the copyright holders make bona fide assessments of fair use. Some owners may not be able to objectively consider that any use of their material is a fair use (notwithstanding the law on the matter), while others struggle to address hundreds or thousands of simultaneous infringements of a particular work and simply do not review the details of each unauthorized use. Rights holders deliver YouTube reference files (audio-only or video) of content they own, metadata describing that content, and policies on what they want YouTube to do when we find a match.
We compare videos uploaded to YouTube against those reference files.
Our technology automatically identifies your content and applies your preferred policy: monetize, track, or block.
Id.
57 id. 58 See id.
U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006).
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In other cases, the actions may be more intentional. In a filing by Verizon regarding a proposal to update the designation of agent, the telecommunications giant vented about the misuse of the takedown system: While Verizon receives valid "notice and takedown" requests from copyright owners and responds promptly with the "take down" and counter-notification processes, we have unfortunately also experienced increasing misuses of the Designated Agent information located on the Copyright Office's website. The misuses fall into a variety of categories, including cases of (i) P2P and other file sharing activities where the material alleged to be infringed does not reside on a service provider's system or network, yet ISPs are often sent automated "takedown" notices by the thousands; (ii) allegations of trademark infringement, where the DMCA "notice and takedown" provision does not apply; (iii) material that is protected by the "fair use" defense of the Copyright Act; and (iv) abusive litigation tactics made in the alarming growth of "copyright troll" lawsuits. The latter involve legal motions often brought by those representing the "adult" entertainment industry who are using improper discovery tactics in federal and state courts to obtain the personal information (name, address and "Mac" number) of hundreds of ISP subscribers per case. In most instances, the litigation never proceeds as the intent is to extract multiple payments from thousands of defendants, many of whom are likely to settle due to the expense of defending the litigation and the embarrassing nature of the content alleged to be infringed. 
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The complaints regarding the abuse of the takedown system suggest that a number of other issues need to be addressed beyond merely the counter-notification process. Although an invalid notification creates no legal duty to respond, 62 it will likely require the recipient to expend some time and effort to evaluate. As discussed subsequently, a notice-andtakedown system for trademarks, no matter how valid an infringement claim, simply does not exist. 6 3 On the other hand, an Internet service provider (ISP) may not be a host to a peer-to-peer file-sharing site, but it might still provide "information location tools" in the form of links to the site or the ads promoting the illegal content. The information location tools are subject to § 512(d) takedown notifications and may be applicable to some of the situations described by Verizon. 64 Noncompliant notifications, such as the identification of links or of trademark infringement could also build a record of actual knowledge of specific infringing activity. That record would support a claim for secondary liability in those areas where an ISP materially participates in the infringement. Google, for example, was involved in a case promoting pharmaceuticals that were illegally sold in the United States and was forced to disgorge a $500 million payment, representing all of its own profits and the profits of the advertisers.s ISPs and other large companies are not immune to liability for illegal conduct. Nonetheless, the frustration of Verizon reflects a real issue of overuse, at least in some instances.
For the average individual uploading to YouTube or another social media site, § 512(g) provides a mechanism to file a counter notification that encourages the reinstatement of the material.
66
The law does not require the service provider to reinstate the material, but instead strips the service provider of the safe harbor protection if it fails to do so. 67 To retain the safe harbor protection, the potentially infringing material must be 
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CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW reinstated "not less than 10, nor more than 14, business days following receipt of the counter notice unless" the service provider is notified that a legal action has been filed. In this way, the notifying party has ten days to bring a legal action before the material is reinstated, but the posting party will be able to have the content reinstated within two weeks.
69
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has created a simple, elegant letter that is generated through a browser-based checklist. 70 Assuming a person seeking to file the counter-notice has selected each of the response boxes in the affirmative, the body of the text provides a nicely drafted response:
Please find attached to this letter a list of material removed by you pursuant to 17 U.S.C. Section 512. I have a good faith belief that this material was removed or disabled in error as a result of mistake or misidentification of the material. I declare that this is true and accurate under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America.
For purposes of this matter, I consent to the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court for the judicial district in which I reside. I also consent to service of process by the person providing notification under Section 512(c)(1)(C) or that person's agent. However, by this letter, I do not waive any other rights, including the ability to pursue an action for the removal or disabling of access to this material, if wrongful.
Having complied with the requirement of Section 512(g)(3), I remind you that you must now replace the blocked or removed material and cease disabling access to it within fourteen business days of your receipt of this notice. Please notify me when this has been done. . . 6 Id. § 5 12(g)(2)(C). 6 9 Id. § 512(g)(2). 70 Counter-Notification, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmcal counter512.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2013).
n Id. To generate the form counter-notice, in which the quoted language appears, select each box on the webpage, input the applicable contact information, and click the "Generate Counter Notice" button.
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As noted in the draft response, the statement that "you must now replace" should be supplemented with, "or lose the safe harbor protections of 17 U.S.C. Section 512(g)(1)." Nonetheless, the letter provides a very nice, consumer-friendly tool for responding to overaggressive takedown requests.
C. Current Rulemaking
One of the problems plaguing the takedown notification system is the chum among the companies and the registered agents who are designated to receive the notices. The Copyright Office is proposing changes to the method of agent designation to make the system more efficient. As a result, the Copyright Office has proposed new rules for designating and updating electronic notice agents. 74 The Copyright Office summarizes the process as follows:
Designation of Online Service Provider Agent
The Copyright Office is proposing to amend its regulations and practices governing the designation by online service providers of agents to receive notifications of claimed copyright infringement as provided for in section 512 of the Copyright Act. The Office intends to implement an electronic process by which service providers may designate agents to receive notifications of claimed infringement and an electronic database of designated agents of online service providers. In order to create the online database and to update the information currently maintained by the Copyright Office, it is proposed that all online service providers must file new designations of agents within one year after new regulations go into effect, and that thereafter all online service providers must update and/or verify the accuracy The public comment period closed in late December 2011,76 from which a general theme emerged. Commentators expressed concern that while an electronic database of the agents would be helpful to the public, the new system would generate a good deal of confusion and could result in the inadvertent loss of safe harbor protection. 77 Failure to update one's agent in the new database, either initially or over time, would result in the automatic loss of the safe harbor protection. 78 This risk would likely be much larger for smaller companies with only occasional user-generated content and rare contact with the takedown system. Because the proposal would strip a company of the safe harbor in the event of non-renewal even if the website information was correct, it could become a trap for the uninitiated. At the same time, however, the database would likely prove far more important for members of the public who are trying to provide a counter-notice, and it would add to the general transparency of the system.
While the Copyright Office is tinkering with the system, the modest scope of the proposed rulemaking also suggests a general acceptance of the current system. 79 The Verizon comments and other complaints certainly show there are flaws in the system, but in the context of the billions of files uploaded and links shared, the system may achieve its compromise fairly effectively.
III. DEFAMATION AND HARMFUL SPEECH
A. Online Defamation Generally
Online, there are many opportunities to be subject to a lawsuit for familiar claims like defamation. 
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United States defamation standards in cyberspace are based on their offline counterparts.
Internet content can theoretically be viewed globally, so it is important to consider online defamation laws that apply to potential plaintiffs in other parts of the world. For example, Australia's highest court found that Dow Jones, publisher of numerous periodicals, including the Wall Street Journal and Barron's, could be sued in Australia over an article that was written in the United States and distributed over the Internet. 87 In addition, the United Kingdom currently is reviewing a draft "Defamation Bill" that was developed in March 2011 and is scheduled to be introduced in amended form to Parliament in May 2011. 88 The United Kingdom's Defamation Bill specifically addresses online defamation.
89
B. Third-Party Limitations from the Communications Decency Act of 1996
Where online defamation differs fundamentally from its physicalworld counterpart is in the area of secondary liability. Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, more commonly known as the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 90 was promulgated in response to a growing concern surrounding online publication of pornography and other adult content. 9 1 Furthermore, the CDA also applies to claims against online publishers of allegedly defamatory content.
92
Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA states, "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." 9 3 8 6 INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 80. 87 
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This provision of the statute reversed the common law doctrine. The Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes the common law rule: "Except as to those who only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it."
94 Newspapers were of particular concern for reporting the libels of others:
Thus a newspaper is subject to liability if it republishes a defamatory statement, although it names the author and another newspaper in which the statement first appeared. The republication of a libel, being a separate publication, may make the second publisher liable although the original publisher is protected by a privilege.
America Online, CompuServe, and other services were concerned that they had neither the knowledge nor capacity to respond to claims of defamation, and feared that such obligations would hobble the development of the nascent Internet; 96 Congress agreed. 9 The House added § 230 to the CDA to protect online service providers from thirdparty liability, and explained its policy for doing so:
It is the policy of the United States-(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
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In exchange, however, Congress sought "to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their services" 9 8 by removing risk of liability in instances where the service providers take steps to remove offensive content.
To provide this protection, § 230(c)(2) provides:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of-(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in [subparagraph (A)].99
The CDA therefore provides nearly blanket protection against liability for user-generated content stored on ISP servers. Service providers are immune from liability regardless of whether they attempt to remove potentially defamatory content. 0 0 Computer mediated services have been developed to provide some hosts a measure of content moderating, but the method of monitoring has no impact on liability.'o Additionally, the protection for service providers is drafted broadly. The CDA defines "interactive computer service" as "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and 
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Most importantly, unlike the duties to address potential copyright issues, the protection for ISPs under the CDA has no takedown obligations, no requirement that the ISP accept notice of potential third-party liability, and no obligation to respond to a complaint of defamation. 103 Courts have interpreted § 230 to relieve ISPs of liability for the defamatory nature of information published by their users.104 In most instances, ISPs are not considered legally responsible for the harm caused by information that their users publish online. 10 This result is consistent with the traditional off-line requirement that a media defendant in a defamation suit must be found to have some degree of fault in publishing allegedly defamatory statements. 
C. Responses to Harmful Speech
Notwithstanding the broad statement of immunity, there may be a number of techniques for addressing defamatory material on the Internet. (explaining that the CDA immunized the web hosting company from liability for hosting a third party's website that allegedly contained defamatory statements about plaintiff despite the web hosting company having received notice regarding the defamatory nature of the content it was hosting). i0 See, e.g., Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1029 (declaring that an operator of a listserv and website is a user of interactive computer services, entitling CDA protection from liability for publishing information provided by another information provider); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006) (ruling that § 230 immunized defendant from liability for republishing an allegedly defamatory article authored by a third party, effectively establishing that "distributors" or "secondary publishers" are entitled to the same broad immunity afforded to publishers under the CDA). 105 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."). 106 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974) (establishing that a private figure who brings a suit for defamation cannot recover without some showing that the media defendant was at fault in publishing the statements at issue). Therefore, legal action often begins with a "cease and desist" letter demanding takedown of the offending published language. 108 Sharing this information with ISPs and asking for relief may result in some response. As noted, ISPs are immunized from liability regardless of whether they choose to respond. 09 Depending on the nature of the content in question, there may also be relief under cyberstalking or cyberbullying laws. "Many states have enacted 'cyberstalking' or 'cyberharassment' laws or have laws that explicitly include electronic forms of communication within more traditional stalking or harassment laws. In addition, recent concerns about protecting minors from online bullying or harassment have led states to enact 'cyberbullying' laws." 1 o To the extent the offensive speech constitutes harassment under the state law definition, there are state statutory remedies authorizing the removal of content and the arrest of parties responsible for posting such content."
Similarly, if the offensive content includes protected informationincluding driver's license information, social security numbers, credit card data, health data, or protected financial information-the various state and federal privacy laws can be used to force the removal of the content. Generally, laws that emphasize liability for disclosure do not limit their liability to "speakers" or "publishers"; failure of ISPs to remove protected information could give rise to direct liability, rather than mere secondary liability as a republisher of the user-generated content. 
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Despite the limitations on copyright causes of action, copyright remains a more effective tool for curbing harmful speech online. Copyright has an express notice-and-takedown mechanism: Any allegations that the offensive content was copyrighted material-such as photographs or unauthorized re-postings of the target's work-need only meet the requirements discussed previously to trigger a mandatory takedown. Of course, the good faith belief that the materials are the copyrighted works of the complainant must be met,' 14 but in many such disputes, the defaming poster has employed copyrighted material subject to a takedown notice. This protection, however, can be abused. The firm Medical Justice Inc. had created a 'vaccine against libel,' a set of contracts providing authority to doctors over online comments posted by patients.""' The control was a provision granting the doctors exclusive copyright in any comments or posts about the health care provider.11
6 The all-too-clever contract sparked a class action lawsuit, and shortly thereafter, was retired." 7 According to a report of the class action lawsuit, a New York Dentist issued the following promise:
[She] promise[d] not to evade HIPAA's patient privacy protection in return for patients' commitment not to disparage her, not to post any comments about her publicly; if the patient writes anything about the dentist, the patient assigns the copyright in those comments to [Dentist Stacy Makhnevich] .
Relying on the form, Makhnevich sent one of her patients invoices purporting to bill him a daily hundred-dollar fine for having posted comments about her on Internet review web sites." 
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The class action lawsuit will undoubtedly highlight the various ethical and professional lapses of the vaccinating agreement. At the outset, if the report is accurate, then the exchange of the legal HIPAA duty cannot even serve as consideration for the transfer of copyright, so the agreement fails to be a valid contract for lack of consideration." 1 9 While transfer of copyright has been upheld in videogame end user license agreements, this has been in the context of the consumer receiving a license to use the game to generate copyrightable content within the game as part of the gameplay.1 20 In the absence of any consumer or public health benefit, the transfer of exclusive rights as a condition of medical services could, and should, be deemed unconscionable. This embarrassing and improvident use of an overly aggressive policing technique should provide a solid reminder of the importance for restraint in policing harmful speech.
Instead, once content that is "bad" but not infringing, defamatory, or invasive of privacy appears online, the better strategy is to mitigate the damage by relying on the rapid staleness of Internet content. Most readers will find such unwanted content through searching. The unwanted content cannot be removed, but it can be pushed down to the latter pages of a search by publishing relevant, positive content that is trafficked and crosslinked.1 2 3 Many services promise such resources.1 24 This Article cannot address the effectiveness of such techniques, but they are far better than the secondary damage one can do to a reputation by unwarranted over-"9 See White v. Vill. of Homewood, 628 N.E.2d 616, 619 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) ("Consideration cannot flow from an act performed pursuant to a pre-existing legal duty.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981) ("Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration; but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what was required by the duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain."). 124 E.g., id.
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IV. TRADEMARK
Unlike the copyright system, which provides for a notice-andtakedown mechanism, trademark owners are left with a much more ambiguous and ill-defined set of steps to take. The only statutory protection for trademarks tailored to the online environment has come in the form of domain name protection.1 25 In the absence of any specifically tailored statutory response, the Lanham Actl26 is interpreted to address the role of trademarks in the online environment. In most instances, this is done by assessing whether the trademark in question was a registered mark 1 27 or was protected from unfair competition, 128 the strength of mark,1 29 and the various factors that suggest a likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff's mark and defendant's mark. 1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. Defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
Id. Each Circuit has its own set of similar factors, described slightly differently. 
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CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW owners of popular products, and using the Internet to sell counterfeit goods does not significantly change the law or its application.131 For trademarks that are not federally registered, protection only applies to the geographic area in which the mark is exploited.
132 Nonetheless, because the Internet has no geographic limitations, this can give rise to additional conflicts between remote users and create consumer confusion where none had previously existed.
3
A. Trademarks and Internet Speech
There remains a great deal of confusion among the public and even the courts regarding the use of trademarks by bloggers, Twitter users, social media enthusiasts, and others.
13 4 The Citizen Media Law Project sums up the situation quite elegantly:
The good news is that courts have consistently protected the public's right to use the trademarks of others in order to engage in criticism, commentary, news reporting and other forms of noncommercial expression. As long as what you're doing is really commentary, criticism, or reporting (etc.), and not a surreptitious attempt to sell goods or services, or to deceptively attract customers or readers you otherwise would not have had, you should be able to defeat a trademark claim brought against you. The bad news is that the law relating to this intersection of trademark law and free expression is complex and confusing.
Neither Congress nor the courts have developed a simple and clear rule that protects your rights to use the trademarks of others for free speech purposes; instead they've developed a complex array of defenses to '. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("A 'counterfeit' is a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark."). What should be the threshold issue is often left until far too late in the analysis, namely whether the unauthorized user of the trademark is making a commercial use of the mark.' 36 This approach has had limited judicial support. 1 Unfortunately, courts seem to treat any links to advertising or income as a commercial use-an approach that would render newspapers subject to commercial speech standards because of the advertisements they run.' 38 Over time, this Internet exceptionalism will erode, but for now, other approaches are necessary to explain what a speaker can do with the trademark of another.
As presently interpreted, the notion of commercial use typically involves using trademarks in parodies.1 3 9
The courts have adopted different ways of incorporating such First Amendment interests into the analysis. For example, some courts have applied the general "likelihood of confusion" analysis, using the First Amendment as a factor in the analysis. Beyond noncommercial use and its parody counterpart, there are two types of fair use. The first type is nominative fair use, under which the trademark can be used when it is used correctly, without creating consumer confusion as to the actual source of the mark.'" Nominative use includes the right to identify the trademarks of goods and services in reviews, critiques, and even competitive advertisements.1 45 The owner of a trademark cannot thwart bad press merely by claiming ownership of the product's name.1 4 6
The second type of fair use involves traditional fair use in which a word, though it may be a trademark in some contexts, is used for its ordinary meaning.1 4 7 No one, for example, would expect the maker of iPads to stop a grocery store from advertising Apples-even if the word were capitalized. The word used in its ordinary context has no trademark value. Similarly, the use of the phrase "fish fry" cannot infringe the trademark "Fish-Fri" when used to describe the purpose of the product. 
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Using a trademark with a link to its competitor's website, misrepresenting endorsements, or otherwise misleading the public (other than self-evident parody) raises issues of actionable consumer confusion or unfair competition. 149 As a result, everyone who posts or tweets must ask themselves both whether they are using a trademark and whether the use is misleading. A misleading use is not protected as a fair use.
150
If the trademark claim is more accurately a claim for product disparagement, then the earlier discussion of defamation is the more applicable standard. '
5
B. Early Commercial Battles-Links, Frames, Domains, and Metatags
Linking
Among business competitors, the issues of trademark infringement are of far more significant concern. Linking has never been considered a copyright violation because the link merely provides access to the copyright owner's own material.1
52
The URL in the link is a fact, an address that cannot be protected by copyright.
153
There has been some concern that deep linking-creating the hypertext 149 Further, hyperlinking does not itself involve a violation of the Copyright Act (whatever it may do for other claims) since no copying is involved, the customer is automatically transferred to the particular genuine web page of the original author. There is no deception in what is happening. This is analogous to using a library's card index to get reference to particular items, albeit faster and more efficiently. In the ensuing years, however, the public's reliance on domain names and metatags has diminished and the courts' expectations of the reasonable consumer have increased.1 77 Today, when used accurately, metatags can represent nominative fair use, accurately listing products or services of a company.1
78
From the broader context of the website, the consumers understand when a third party is selling a product lawfully, but without authorization. Retailers can list the names of the products on their websites and in the metatags enabling search engines without the permission of the manufacturers. When instead the metatags are used as part of a larger effort to create consumer confusion, however, the invisible nature of the metatag will not shield its user from creating consumer confusion and trademark infringement.1
79
In sum, the old battles of linking, framing, domain names, and metatags have comfortably resolved back into the traditional notions of likelihood of consumer confusion. Courts distinguish nominative and descriptive use of terms from the misuse of terms and marks likely to create consumer confusion, just as they have outside the Internet for many decades.
C New Battles-Keyword Advertising
Just as the trademark disputes over frames and metatags reflected the tension between business owners to define fair competition, the current controversy focuses on the importance of "search" as the primary method 176 Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir.
1999).
1' Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing the lower court because they used too low a standard for the expectations of the modern reasonable consumer, and applying as another relevant factor the difference between domain name and keyword search confusion AdWords is Google's program through which advertisers purchase terms (or keywords). When entered as a search term, the keyword triggers the appearance of the advertiser's ad and link. An advertiser's purchase of a particular term causes the advertiser's ad and link to be displayed on the user's screen whenever a searcher launches a Google search based on the purchased search term. Advertisers pay Google based on the number of times Internet users "click" on the advertisement, so as to link to the advertiser's website. 
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CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW appearance on the search engine-constituted a use in commerce."ss This debate was reminiscent of the early discussion of metatags because the words themselves were not read by the consumer but instead led the software to present different content. Originally, the Ninth Circuit "assumed, without expressly deciding, that the use of a trademark as a search engine keyword that triggers the display of a competitor's advertisement is a 'use in commerce' under the Lanham Act." 86 The Second Circuit struggled more with the concept, but in a very thoughtful opinion, answered the question in the affirmative 87 and seemed to lay the question to rest. 8 8 Determining that the keyword is a use in commerce constitutes only the threshold question regarding the likelihood of consumer confusion. For the search engine companies and intermediaries, the probable result is that they cannot be found to be creating consumer confusion with their customers advertising so long as they continue to clearly distinguish between advertisements based upon the keyword entries and the actual results of their algorithms. The separation between ads and indexed searches is a business choice that is presently being made by Google, Microsoft (owner of Bing), and the companies that license their search services. 18 Nothing in the architecture of the search algorithm requires this separation.' 90 On the other hand, the concern over trademark liability and consumer backlash at the potential confusion is likely to keep the practice stable-at least for now.
Between competitors, the situation is less clear. A recent example of this dispute arose when a competitor of the national law firm of Binder and
